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that among the latter (where the division of labor was not great) a very considerable
part of the law was restitutive.
The least successful chapter, to this reviewer, is the last, in which Cheyenne law
is appreciated rather than described. The authors, citing cases, intensify their expres-
sions of almost aesthetic satisfaction with the "sure" and "nice" juristic sense of the
Cheyennes. They regard these Indians as notably more able deciders of cases and
makers of law than other comparable peoples. The authors will perhaps pardon this
admirer of their work a confession that he cannot see this as they do. The materials
presented here are better than we have from other such peoples, and the authors came
to understand much of Cheyenne life. If other peoples were known as well, and as
abundant materials were thoroughly studied, perhaps the Cheyenne would not seem
quite so superior. Moreover, it seems that in this chapter the authors do depart to
some extent from their definition of law. For the decisions made in these Cheyenne
cases, which the authors so admire, are decisions in which the personal, the notions
of decency and rightness, and, in general, all the sub-legal stuff of social control, played
a part. Yet the authors hail the success, especially, of Cheyenne juristic sense. It is
the effectiveness of a well-organized culture to deal with cases of conflict and difficulty
that is basically to be recognized-and admired, if you like. What is shown by these
materials is how particular cases are settled, partly to get those cases settled and partly
to make effective the functioning of the society in the future. But the rules that are
made and the settlement of the cases are only in part a matter of law. Law has an
easier time of it in a primitive society than it has in a modern society, for in the former
there is strong consensus, a common moral order, and consistency of custom and
institution.
RoBERT REDFIELDt
The Mysterious Science of the Law. By Daniel J. Boorstin.* Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1941. Pp. xviii, 257. $3.00.
This review is based on the principle that "before estimating a book it is well to
read its title with care" and also its subtitle.,
The subtitle of this book is "An essay on Blackstone's Commentaries showing how
Blackstone, employing eighteenth-century ideas of science, religion, history, esthetics,
and philosophy, made of the law at once a conservative and a mysterious science."
Mr. Boorstin's book begins with the statement that when Blackstone wrote his
Commntaries the world of ideas of the mid-eighteenth century was disturbed by "a
new science," which no thinker could ignore. Blackstone realized that this new sci-
ence had a growing attraction for man's imagination. Therefore, "the vocabulary of
his day required that he should somehow present the study of law as a science" for
his gentlemen readers. But for such an audience the application to a legal system of
scientific method, which created doubts rather than suppressed them, held greater
dangers than in the field of physics or philosophy.
Blackstone, "whb saw the law as the bulwark of existing society," could not be
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satisfied with dangerous inquiry into existing institutions. "The Science of Law was
not 6nough. There must also be a Mystery of Law, a decent veil to protect ultimate
values from the devouring gaze of Reason." So Blackstone in his Commentaries made
"the law" not only a science, but also a mysterious science.
How was this mysterious science made a conservative one? Blackstone presented
the English legal system as a rational and coherent institution, despite the fact that by
drawing on ideas in many fields he became involved in the contrary ways of thinking
of his time. But unity was given to his work by a system of values: humanity, liberty,
and property, and the most important of these was property. By this unity, in a hand-
book for students and laymen, Blackstone was able to persuade such readers that the
English legal system, embodying these values, was entitled to reverence and support.
In achieving this unity, Blackstone used an eighteenth-century esthetic appeal, that
of neat classification, orderly arrangement, and beautiful symmetry. This unity of
thought and structure, set out in a serene and stately style, and without apparent
confusion or contradiction to his nonprofessional readers, presented the English legal
system as so awe-inspiring that it lulled into unquestioning reverence and banished
unhealthful doubts. -
This is a brief outline of Mr. Boorstin's book, based on the subtitle. Since the
book is addressed to the lawyer, to the student of the history of thought, and to those
concerned with the problem of method in social sciences, reviewers will no doubt con-
sider various phases of the book along widely divergent lines. For this reviewer, even
after reading the book, there lingers the suspicion that the subtitle is an overstate-
ment, as "the law" was at least conservative, though not a mystery or a science, even
before the Commentaries appeared and would have continued so had Blackstone not
published his work.
Unless the reader is on his guard, Mr. Boorstin's book may leave the impression
that Blackstone was far more adroit than has been thought as a defender of a system
and in making "men think they see, in order to prevent their seeing."2 "The exag-
gerated views as to Blackstone's optimism and conservatism" and the gibbeting of
Blackstone as the enemy of all reform, due to Bentham's abuse,3 may, in part, appear
confirmed by the purpose of this book, which reveals how Blackstone used the ideas
of his time "to the end of demonstrating the desirability of certain preconceived social
values."
Yet Mr. Boorstin writes that "we are not suggesting that Blackstone's use of the
prevailing ways of thought to bring the reader to a certain conclusion was always, or
even often, conscious."4 And later he adds that, "we are not mainly concerned with
this question; we are interested, rather, in ascertaining the meaning of the Commen-
taries in his time." s Notwithstanding this latter remark, it appears that the purpose
of the book is to show-how "the processes of reason are employed by the student of
society to support whatever social values he accepts. ' 6 In his conclusion, Mr. Boorstin
affirms that there is nothing diabolical or unfair in encouraging the acceptance of
ultimate values in which one profoundly believes.7 Such statements as the last two
may produce the belief that Blackstone cunningly avoided the scientific method of his
day in order to enshroud "the law" in mystery and to discourage criticism or doubt.
2 10 Works of Jeremy Bentham 41 (Bowring's ed. 1843).
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It is to be hoped that Mr. Boorstin, on the basis of work already done, can supple-
ment his study of Blackstone and the Commentaries with a book less objective, in
which is shown the influence of the spirit and representative minds of the mid-eight-
eenth century on Blackstone, a conservative by temperament, association, position,
and profession. Such a book, not devoted to describing how Blackstone, consciously
or otherwise, employed the ideas of his time to accomplish a certain end, would prob-
ably place the Commentaries in a different light than that in which it appears in this
work. It is not to be inferred that Mr. Boorstin has overlooked this influence or failed
to warn his readers in a mild way of it. For he states that "Blackstone's work, like
every human document, was the product of a particular time and a particular place" 8
and that "in the eighteenth century, many of the most profound and most influential
students of society approached their study with the conviction that institutions were
fundamentally beyond human criticism."9 This hope is also expressed because re-
cent biographies of Blackstone treat him apart from the time in which he lived.!o
These statements should in no way be considered as detracting from certain defini-
tive merits of Mr. Boorstin's book, a detailed, scholarly, and novel exposition, based
on an unusually minute study of the Commentaries and a wide survey of non-legal
material of the eighteenth century. It will surely challenge the interest of the student
of legal history and serve as provocative material in a course in legal history. But as
Blackstone's handbook may have misled his uncritical audience, so may Mr. Boorstin's
book mislead those of the "semantic school," who wish to find additional authority for
their belief that "the law" is always crafty and mystical in its use of ideas and words
and that lawyers as jurisprudential scientists are ever "tricksters and quibblers."' "
For readers not seeking self-serving evidence, Mr. Boorstin's dosing pages should
be read first. It is there he states "we shall not be unfair if, in determining the stature
of the man and the validity of the document, while admitting its logical limitations,"
we judge mainly by the social meaning of the values of humanity, liberty, and prop-
erty in Blackstone's time, and not by "the hyper-scientific approach to institutions."-
J. S. WATERWANt
Corporate Dividends. By Donald Kehl.* New York: The Ronald Press Co., r941.
Pp. xi, 367. $7.50.
This book is a valuable discussion of the legal problems relating to surplus and
profit distributions by business corporations. The particular matters treated by the
author include not only the determination of the fund available for dividends, but
also the declaration, payment, and revocation of dividends, remedies against directors
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